Publica Rusia documentos secretos sobre Cuba y Krushchev
Introduction in Spanish, Article below in English
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Subject: Publica Rusia documentos secretos sobre Cuba y Krushchev.
Date: Wednesday, September 17, 2003 3:44 PM
Publica Rusia documentos secretos sobre Cuba y Krushchev.
NY Times 9/14/03.
Los documentos citados prueban que lo que se buscaba después de la retirada
de los proyectiles era una garantía de la permanencia de Castro en el poder.
Se consiguió por décadas y hoy aún hoy pagamos la cuenta. ESTADOS UNIDOS
Y CUBA: YA ES HORA DE PLASMAR UNA POLÍTICA EFECTIVA Cita: "En este gran país
siempre han tenido un lugar relevante los principios y el básico es la
defensa de la libertad. Para Estados Unidos la libertad de Cuba debe ser una causa
justa y en parte debida (los cubanos también tenemos responsabilidades)
porque la abandonada y por ello fracasada invasión de Bahía de Cochinos validó a
Castro como líder 'invencible' mientras que el pacto Kennedy-Khruschev lo
consolidó e hizo intocable. Es mayormente por esto que Cuba es aún una
dictadura."
Krushchev dice: "Hemos hecho de Cuba el foco del mundo. Los dos sistemas se
han enfrentado. Kennedy nos dice que retiremos los cohetes de Cuba.
Respondemos: Dennos una garantía firme de que no invadirán a Cuba. Eso no es
malo.....debemos hacer que el enemigo se sienta seguro y obtener de ellos una promesa
segura respecto a Cuba."
Nuestra traducción de las notas taquigráficas de la sesiones del presidium
soviético en lo que concierne a Cuba.
Khrushchev dice: "Hemos hecho de Cuba el foco del mundo. Los dos sistemas
se han enfrentado. Kennedy nos dice que retiremos los cohetes de Cuba.
Respondemos: Dennos una garantía firme de que no invadirán a Cuba. Eso no es
malo.....debemos hacer que el enemigo se sienta seguro y obtener de ellos una
promesa segura respecto a Cuba. Es más, no debemos dejar que [el asunto] llegue al
punto de ebullición. Podemos derrotar a los Estados Unidos desde el
territorio Soviético. De ahora en adelante Cuba no será lo que fue antes. Ellos, los
americanos nos amenazan con un bloqueo económico pero los Estados Unidos no
atacarán a Cuba. No debemos intensificar la situación sino seguir una política
racional. Así fortaleceremos a Cuba y la salvaremos por dos o tres años.
Dentro de unos pocos años les será aun mas difícil invadirla. Hay que jugar sin
buscar venganzas, sin perder la cabeza. La iniciativa está en nuestras manos,
no debemos temer. Ellos comenzaron y se amedrentaron. No nos conviene la
guerra. El futuro no depende de Cuba sino de nuestro país.' Khrushchev también
determinó como se le debería transmitir la decisión a Castro: " Tuvimos éxito
en ciertas cosas y fallamos en otras. Lo que tenemos hoy es una situación
positiva. Por qué es positiva? Porque el mundo tiene su atención puesta en Cuba.
Los cohetes han tenido un resultado positivo. El tiempo pasará. Si es
necesario los cohetes volverán."
We have now made Cuba the focus of the world. The two systems have met head
on. Kennedy is telling us to take our rockets out of Cuba. We reply, "Give
us a firm guarantee, a promise that the Americans will not attack Cuba."
That's not bad. . . .We must let the enemy feel secure and obtain [from them] an
assurance with regard to Cuba. Moreover, it should not be brought to the
boiling point. We can also defeat the U.S.A. from U.S.S.R. territory. From now on,
Cuba will not be what it was before.They, the Americans, threaten an
economic blockade, but the U.S.A. will not attack Cuba. We must not intensify the
situation, but conduct a rational policy. This way we will strengthen Cuba and
save it for two to three years. While in a few years it will be even harder
[for the United States] to deal with it. You have to play, but without taking
revenge, without losing your head. The initiative is in our hands, there is
no need to be afraid. [They] started and then became afraid. It is not
advantageous for us to wage war. The future does not depend on Cuba, but on our
country.Khrushchev also determined how the decision should be conveyed to
Castro:We have succeeded with some things and not with others. What we have today is
a positive situation. What is positive about it? The whole world is fixated
on Cuba. The rockets have played their positive role. Time will pass. If it
is necessary, the missiles can appear there again.
New York Times September 14, 2003WORD FOR WORD
Khrushchev Unplugged From the Middle East to Cuba
FROM 1954 to 1965, a faceless bureaucrat named Vladimir Malin was the
official note-taker at meetings of the leadership of the Soviet Union. His
handwritten minutes, kept in a ledger like that used by Western accountants, were the
holy grail of the Central Intelligence Agency's unsuccessful efforts to
penetrate the Kremlin. They remained closed until last week, when they were
released by archivists at the Russian State Archives of Contemporary History in
Moscow.
The documents reveal a troubled Presidium struggling to feed its people,
and a leader, Nikita S. Khrushchev, struggling to assert himself abroad and
stay competitive with the United States. Malin's notes also provide a valuable
companion to the secret tape recordings made by the Kennedy White House during
the Cuban missile crisis, a record showing the American mind-set during the
most dangerous moments of the cold war.
Excerpts follow from translations made by the Miller Center of Public
Affairs at the University of Virginia, which is producing an English-language
edition of the documents under an agreement with the Russian archives. More
excerpts are available online at www.millercenter.virginia.edu. -- TIMOTHY
NAFTALI
When American troops entered Lebanon in July 1958 to stabilize its
government, the Soviet Union feared that the next move by the United States would be
to invade Iraq, where a pro-Western government had just been toppled.
Speaking with his colleagues Aleksei N. Kosygin and Anastas I. Mikoyan, Khrushchev
suggested sending a stern letter to President Dwight D. Eisenhower comparing
the entry into Lebanon to Nazi Germany's invasion of Poland in 1939. Although
he was Communist Party leader, at this point Khrushchev did not always get
his way:
Kosygin: Shouldn't we state our positions on the Middle East — that we don't
have any material interests there?
Khrushchev: All the world knows that we have no material interests
whatsoever. Our interests are limited to one thing, what is congruent with the
aspirations of countries all over the world: to ensure peace in the Middle East, to
ensure the independence of Arab countries and noninterference, etc. This is
correct.
This letter should be prepared from the position of strength, not one that
is pleading, but from a position fully aware of our strength and
responsibility. It is necessary to say here that we make this appeal because we cannot be
indifferent, but we don't want to resolve this question by means of war.
Mikoyan: I wouldn't mention Hitler. It is necessary to say that all wars in
history have shown that they can lead to this kind of end. If we mention
Hitler, it will infuriate Eisenhower. If we draw a parallel to Poland here, they
will start coming after us. Even if we do not mention Hitler, everyone will
understand what these wars lead to.
Khrushchev: For the sake of compromise, I don't insist on it.
By 1961 Khrushchev was master of the Presidium. On the eve of his first and
only summit meeting with John F. Kennedy, he informed the Kremlin that he
intended to confront the American president over the Western military presence
in Berlin. Khrushchev explained that Moscow should be willing to shut down the
air corridor to the city, even at the risk of war:
Our position is very strong, but of course we will have to really intimidate
them now. For example, if there is any flying around, we will have to bring
[those] airplanes down.
Could they respond with a provocative act? They could. [But] if we don't
bring the planes down, this would mean that we are capitulating. . . . In a
word, politics is politics. If we want to carry out our policy, and if we want it
to be acknowledged, respected and feared, it is necessary to be firm.
In 1961, Khrushchev failed in his effort to force NATO out of West Berlin
through intimidation. Irritated by Washington's resolve, Khrushchev informed
his colleagues in January 1962 that this was not the time to ease up on the
United States, using a glass of water as a metaphor:
We should increase the pressure, we must not doze off, and, while growing,
we should let the opponent feel this growth. But don't pour the last drop to
make the cup overflow. Be just like a meniscus, which, according to the laws
of surface tension in liquid, is generated in order that the liquid doesn't
pour out past the rim.
Here's our policy: to always have a wine glass with a meniscus. Because if
we don't have a meniscus . . . we let the enemy live peacefully. . . . We must
not let him, but we must not do the provoking ourselves.
Khrushchev was not sure what role Kennedy would play in his strategy. He
felt the American people were far more stridently anti-Communist than the
president:
This is a young and capable man; it is necessary to give him his due. But
he can neither stand up to the American public, nor can he lead them.
While on a state visit to Bulgaria in 1962, Khrushchev came up with the
idea of deploying nuclear missiles to Cuba. The meniscus strategy was failing,
and Khrushchev believed that as long as the United States remained too
confident, bilateral agreements would be impossible and third-world allies,
especially Fidel Castro's Cuba, would be vulnerable. On his return to Moscow,
Khrushchev surprised his colleagues with a proposal to deal with American power,
rendered tersely by Malin as "an offensive policy":
Come to an agreement with F. Castro, conclude a military agreement
regarding joint defense.
Deploy nuclear-missile weapons.
Deliver them secretly.
Then declare. Missiles [will be] under our command.
This will be an offensive policy.
But the Soviets were unable to deliver the missiles secretly. The operation
was only half completed when American spy planes detected the activity. On
Oct. 25, after the United States Navy imposed a blockade around Cuba, Malin
recorded Khrushchev's decision to back down to avoid a nuclear war. There was
little for Khrushchev to cheer, but he felt his ploy scared the White House:
The Americans say that the missile launchers in Cuba must be dismantled.
Perhaps this ought to be done. This is not capitulation on our part. If we
fire, they will also fire. There is no doubt that the Americans have turned into
cowards. . . .
We have now made Cuba the focus of the world. The two systems have met head
on. Kennedy is telling us to take our rockets out of Cuba. We reply, "Give
us a firm guarantee, a promise that the Americans will not attack Cuba."
That's not bad. . . .
We must let the enemy feel secure and obtain [from them] an assurance with
regard to Cuba. Moreover, it should not be brought to the boiling point. We
can also defeat the U.S.A. from U.S.S.R. territory. From now on, Cuba will not
be what it was before.
They, the Americans, threaten an economic blockade, but the U.S.A. will not
attack Cuba. We must not intensify the situation, but conduct a rational
policy. This way we will strengthen Cuba and save it for two to three years.
While in a few years it will be even harder [for the United States] to deal with
it.
You have to play, but without taking revenge, without losing your head. The
initiative is in our hands, there is no need to be afraid. [They] started and
then became afraid. It is not advantageous for us to wage war. The future
does not depend on Cuba, but on our country.
Khrushchev also determined how the decision should be conveyed to Castro:
We have succeeded with some things and not with others. What we have today
is a positive situation. What is positive about it? The whole world is
fixated on Cuba. The rockets have played their positive role. Time will pass. If it
is necessary, the missiles can appear there again.
The missiles were removed, and the Soviets never tried to reintroduce them.
On the home front, however, Khrushchev did not abandon his use of
improvisation and intimidation. Two years later, his colleagues removed him from
office.
lavozdecubalibre.com
Lillian Martinez
PO Box 293
Round Rock Texas USA 78680-0293
512 246-2597 - Voice
512 246-1478 - Fax
Copyright© 2003
Article: NY Times
Introduction: www.lavozdecubalibre.com
Created -
August 27, 2003
Revised - 8/15/05
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